Mechanisms of Direct Citizen Participation in Decisions on Sovereign Debt

Abstract

The persistent issue of sovereign debt in Argentina significantly impacts the population’s quality of life and is a challenging subject for democratic consensus. This article addresses debt management and proposes constitutional reforms to enhance citizen participation in borrowing decisions. The relevance of the study lies in the need to tackle the cyclical crises affecting the Argentine economy and ensure that debt decisions are not managed unilaterally by the Executive with limited democratic legitimacy. The objective is to propose a series of incremental reforms to the Argentine National Constitution: first, to include borrowing policies among the matters prohibited from being addressed through emergency decrees, requiring stricter legislative oversight; second, to recommend that, in line with the Inter-American Human Rights System, debt be regulated through formal and substantive law, ensuring broad citizen participation. To illustrate the feasibility of these proposals, successful participatory models in Argentina and constitutional reforms in Ecuador and Iceland are examined. The conclusion is that, although they do not eliminate the involvement of multilateral organizations, these mechanisms foster public interest and empower citizens in discussions on sovereign debt, ensuring informed and democratic consent in decisions that affect the nation.